[FT]Take this weekend off, Hank

Take this weekend off, Hank
By John Gapper

Published: September 10 2008 19:15 | Last updated: September 10 2008 19:15

I do not know what plans Hank Paulson, the US Treasury secretary, has for the weekend. Bird-watching, perhaps. Whatever they are, may I suggest that he sticks to them?
헨리폴슨이 어쩌려는지 모르겠다. 지금까지 해온 데로 지켜보기만 할까?

Mr Paulson is a keen ornithologist but he is also an energetic intervener in financial markets and, when he has worked on weekends recently, the US taxpayer has paid dearly.
폴슨은 방관자이면서 간섭자이기도 했다.

In March, it was a line of funding to steer Bear Stearns, the investment bank, into the hands of JPMorgan Chase. On Sunday, it was the bail-out of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the quasi-public mortgage lenders, which could cost the US government $200bn (€143bn, £114bn) or more.
3월에는 제이피 모건에게 베어 스턴스를 살려주도록 요청했고, 이번 일요일에는 페니매와 프레디맥에 공적자금을 투입했다.

It is only Thursday and, already, others seem to be preparing to interrupt his days of rest again.
그가 다시 간섭하지 않을까?

The first is Lehman Brothers, whose shares fell sharply after the failure of its talks with Korea Development Bank aimed at gaining a capital injection to offset its mortgage-related losses. It yesterday disclosed a $3.9bn loss and plans to sell a stake in its fund management arm.
레만이 첫 목표물이다. 레만은 한국산업은행이 인수를 포기했고, 최근 상각액이 39억 달러로 드러났다.

Then there are the US regional banks that hold preferred shares in Fannie and Freddie, which Mr Paulson caused to plunge in value. They face their own financial crises and Tony James, president of Blackstone, the private equity group, this week predicted “massive defaults”.
다음은 미국 지역은행이다. 그들은 페니매와 프레디맥의 우선주를 가지고 있다. 블랙스톤의 토니 제임스는 강력한 채무불이행선언이 이어질 걸로 예상한다.

Apart from banks, there are the Detroit carmakers, which have persuaded Congress to give them $25bn in soft loans. That is far more than the 1980 Chrysler bail-out but they want to double the hand-out, and both presidential candidates, Barack Obama and John McCain, have meekly fallen in line.
디트로이트 자동차 시장도 문제다. 자동차 회사들은 정부에 보조금을 달라고 요청했다. 대통령 후보들은 여기에 적극 찬성하고 있다.

In an election year, neither party dares to place fiscal discipline above politics and the urge to placate US voters and foreign investors.
투표가 있는 해에 어떤 정당도 재무정책을 제한 할 수 없고 미국 투표권자와 외국 투자자의 눈치를 봐야한다.

The US government has talked tough about moral hazard and its not wanting to bail out failed institutions but has been a soft touch. Eventually, someone must say “no” to the line of those angling to pile their own losses on to the budget deficit, which could reach $440bn next year. Mr Paulson, who headed Goldman Sachs before what Mr James called “the meltdown years”, needs to be that man.
미국 정부는 도덕적 해이를 강력히 다루고 부실한 회사를 밝혀내야 하지만 밍기적 거린다. 결과적으로 누군가는 반드시 도움요청에 아니요라고 대답하고 정부재정적자액을 줄여야한다. 폴슨이 그렇게 해야 한다.

It was not exactly comforting that credit ratings agencies had to declare to investors that the Fannie and Freddie bail-out would not affect the country’s triple-A sovereign rating. When people are assured that nothing is wrong, it makes them wonder. The rating has supported the dollar’s reserve currency status for most of the past century. Yet, on Tuesday, the cost of insuring Treasury bonds against a US government default spiked to a record level.
페니와 프레디에 정부가 공적자금을 투입하면서 미 정부채의 위험도는 사상 최고치를 기록했다.

It is true that the Fannie and Freddie intervention does not, in itself, pose grave financial risks to the US. Standard & Poor’s estimates the worst case loss at $325bn, or 2.5 per cent of US gross domestic product, less than a third of the bill for Japan’s banking crisis in the 1990s. “It is one of the largest financial interventions not only in US history but in any country’s history. But the cost to the government is manageable,” says John Chambers, an S&P analyst.
정부가 페니와 프레디에 개입한다고 해서 미국의 금융위기가 심각해 지는 것은 아니다. 부실 정도는 일본의 90년대 은행위기보다 덜하다. S&P는 정부개입이 미국 정부가 감당할 만한 정도라고 말한다.

The bigger problem is the precedent that it, once again, sets. Mr Paulson emphasised on Sunday that Fannie and Freddie were “unique” bodies that deserved special treatment. One analyst describes this as a “dog whistle” to Lehman not to expect capital from Capitol Hill.
더 큰 문제는 이번 일이 전례로 남아 정부의 공적자금 투입이 계속 이뤄질 수 있다는 것이다. 정부는 분명히 페니와 프레디에 한해서만 공적자금을 투입한다고 했다. 한 분석가는 이를 두고 정부가 레만에게 도움을 바라지 말라는 신호를 보내는 거라고 말했다.

If it was a signal, then good, and I trust Mr Paulson will stick to his warning. Lehman, like other big investment banks, can get short-term funding from the Federal Reserve if all else fails, a guarantee put in place after Bear Stearns’ takeover.
만약 그렇다면 좋은 일이고 폴슨이 이를 고수할 걸로 본다. 레만은 다른 투자은행처럼 연준에서 단기자금을 빌리면 된다.

That should prevent a run on the bank and it is the only money the Fed or the Treasury should offer. Mr Paulson or Tim Geithner, president of the New York Fed, can put pressure on banks or investors with deep pockets to give Lehman capital but must not do so themselves.
정부는 투자자들이 돈을 대도록 요구할 거다.

The reality is that Lehman, like General Motors and Ford, got itself into this mess and ought to address it itself. Dick Fuld, Lehman’s prickly and obstinate chairman and chief executive, has turned down offers valuing it at less than book value. His pride has led to Lehman’s fall.
레만의 고집쟁이 사장은 장부가치보다 낮은가격에 레만을 매각하지 않겠다고 했다. 사장이 레만을 나락으로 몰고 있다.

Similarly, no one forced US regional banks to invest in Fannie and Freddie preferred shares. It should have occurred to them that their dividends were high because of the risk of losing their money if the two entities got into trouble. I thought bankers knew that kind of thing.
지역은행도 마찬가지다. 그들이 프레디와 페니메에 투자한 것은 위험을 감수하고 높은 배당을 주기때문이 아닌가. 그동안 높은 수익을 거둬갔다면 위험도 받아들여야 한다.

In normal times, no one would entertain the notion that such supposedly sophisticated financial institutions should get a handout from the taxpayers. But these are not normal times and Mr Paulson’s fear of allowing financial chaos has pushed him on to the defensive.
평소같으면 누구도 세금이 부실한 은행에 들어가는 것을 바라지 않을 것이다. 하지만 지금은 독특한 상황이다. 금융혼란을 우려하기 때문에 폴슨은 방어적으로 대응하고 있다.

It is time to push back. The Fed and the government had to stand behind Bear Stearns and prevent a run on the dollar by making good the promises that Fannie and Freddie issued to foreign investors. But there is a cost to playing with the government’s balance sheet.
상황을 되돌릴 시간이다. 정부와 중앙은행은 부실한 기관을 보증하면서 외국투자자들의 이탈을 막아야만 했다. 그러나 비용은 정부의 장부에 남아있다.

It sounds outlandish that the US could lose its triple-A status, which it has held since before Standard merged with Poor’s in 1941. But stuff happens. A full-blown recession and bail-out of the banking system would put public finances under severe strain.
미국은 최상위 신용등급을 잃는 기이한 처지에 놓였다. 경기침체와 은행위기가 정부재정에 심각한 위기를 가져왔다.

Japan lost triple-A status for a time, as did Denmark, Finland and Sweden during the Scandinavian banking crisis. Mr Paulson has tried to keep the dollar strong and confidence intact but endless intervention will have the opposite effect.
일본, 덴마크, 스칸디나비아반도의 국가들도 그런 적이 있다. 폴슨은 달러를 강하게 유지하려 하지만 끊임없는 개입은 정반대의 효과만 나타낸다.

If he takes the weekend off and allows events to unfold, it will show that Fannie and Freddie were indeed unique and that the government has not lost its nerve. Inaction speaks louder than words.
만약 폴슨이 휴가를 가서 더 이상 개입하지 않겠다는 자신의 생각을 명확히 시장에 전달한다면 정부는 체력을 회복할 수 있을거다. 게으름이 단어들보다 소리가 크다.

john.gapper@ft.com
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008